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TWO DIFFERENT MOVEMENTS AS A RESPONSE TO TWO DIFFERENT HOMOGENIZING MECHANISMS: A COMPARATIVE READING OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN TURKEY AND ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT IN CHIAPAS, MEXICO

İKİ FARKLI TEK TİPLEŞTİRİCİ MEKANİZMAYA TEPKİ OLARAK İKİ FARKLI SOSYAL HAREKET: MEKSİKA, CHİAPAS'DA ZAPATİSTA HAREKETİ İLE TÜRKİYE'DE KÜRT HAREKETİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI OKUMASI

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Abstract

This article is set out to examine the homogenizing nature of two factors: nation-building and globalization and social movements emerged within the regions of two countries, Turkey and Mexico. On the one hand, homogenizing mechanism in Turkey is depicted as the general framework of nation-building, on the other side, the intertwined relationship between patterns of liberal institutionalism, globalization and regionalism is depicted as the mechanisms of harassment of original identities and so-long protected lands. In order to grasp the intertwined relationship between globalization and regionalism, the latter as a mechanism of getting in harmony with the former, a general overview of the literature is presented. One needs to grasp the general framework that forced such a social movement like Zapatista to rebel against the systemic structure and that's why the paper puts more emphasis on the review of what the scholars with different perspectives think about the globalization and regionalism. As much as the subject concerned, a brief overview of the backgrounds for both the Zapatista and Kurdish movements is given in order to reflect the notion of hegemony prevailing in the milieus that these two social movements emerged. The article lastly focuses on the fact that both Kurdish movement in Turkey and Zapatista Movement in Mexico paved the way for other subaltern identities to speak louder than before. A comparative reading of these two Marxist movements is studied here in order to appreciate *de facto* contributions made to the democratization of the countries concerned.

Key Words: Kurdish Movement, the Zapatista, Regionalism, Democratization, Civil Society, Identity

Özet

Bu makale Türkiye'de ulus devlet oluşturma ve Meksika'da küreselleşme sürecinin tek tipleştirici etkilerine karşı, her iki ülkenin belirli iki bölgesinde ortaya çıkan iki farklı sosyal hareketi ele almaktadır. Bir yandan, Türkiye'de öne çıkan tek tipleştirici etmen ulus devlet oluşturma mekanizmaları olarak ele alınırken, öte yandan girift ilişki içinde bulunan kurumsal liberalizm, küreselleşme ve bölgeselcilik, orijinal (alt) kimliklerin ve uzun zamandır korunmayı başarmış yörelerin tacize uğramasına ön ayak olmaları bakımından ele alınmaktadır. Bölgeselciliğin küreselleşmeye ayak uydurma mekanizması olarak ele alınması ile, küreselleşme ve bölgeselcilik arasındaki iç içe ilişkiyi anlayabilmek için genel bir literatür taraması yapılmış ve makalenin ilk bölümlerine yansıtılmıştır. Zapatista gibi bir hareketin ortaya çıkışını ve var olan sistemik yapıya karşı başkaldırısını daha iyi anlayabilmek için, bu hareketin ortaya çıktığı alt yapının genel bir çerçevesi küreselleşme ve bölgeselcilik açısından farklı ekollere ait akademisyenlerin şimdiye kadar ortaya koydukları düşünceler çerçevesinde ön plana çıkarılarak ortaya konulmaktadır. Bu iki sosyal hareketin ortaya çıktığı alanlarda tek-tipleştirici güçler ile mücadele argümanının ortaya konulması bakımından, her iki hareketin de kısa bir arka planı, bu karşılaştırmalı konunun gerektirdiği ölçüde ortaya konulmuştur. . Türkiye'deki Kürt hareketi ile Meksika'daki Zapatista hareketinin diğer alt kimliklerin kendini ifade etmesi için açtığı yollar ise karşılaştırmalı bir dille ortaya konulacaktır. Bu iki Marksist hareketin karşılaştırmalı okuması, her iki hareketin dolaylı ya da direkt olarak bulundukları ülkelerdeki demokratikleşmeye sağladıkları katkıların ortaya konulabilmesi açısından ele alınmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kürt Hareketi, Zapatista, Bölgeselcilik, Demokratikleşme, Sivil Toplum, Kimlik

Introduction

This article is set out to examine the homogenizing nature of two factors: nation-building and globalization and solidarities created within the regions of two countries, Turkey and Mexico. On the one hand, homogenizing mechanism in Turkey is depicted as the general framework of nation-building, on the other side, the intertwined relationship between liberal institutionalism, globalization and regionalism is depicted as the mechanisms of harassment of original identities and so long protected lands. In order to grasp the intertwined relationship between globalization and regionalism, the latter as a mechanism of getting in harmony with the former, a general overview of the literature is presented. This paper has been divided into four main parts, the first and second parts deal with the overview of the systemic background of "new regionalism" and "divisions created within the countries" against which the Zapatista movement emerged as an anti-force to the systemic structure being formed. The third part, stemming from the idea that both nation building mechanisms and globalization are of homogenizing nature, deals with the Kurdish movement in Turkey as a movement emerged against the homogenizing nature of nation-building. The last part assesses the communalities between these two

originally Marxist movements, the Zapatista and Kurdistan Workers' Party movement. As much as the subject concerned, a general overview of the background for both Zapatista and Kurdish movement is given in order to reflect the notion of hegemony prevailing in the milieus that these two social movements emerged. A comparative reading of these two Marxist movements is studied here in order to appreciate the contributions made to the democratization of the countries concerned. A detailed review of how globalization and regionalism is needed to appreciate their effects on the countries and to see what kinds of restrictions or flexibilities are on table. It is also of significance to note that the abbreviation the PKK will be used for Kurdistan Workers' Party.

Regionalism is a post-WW2 phenomena based on the integration of geographically close countries and often related to regional organizations and trade agreements. The regional regimes emerged after 1950s, when the global trade started to release from the boundaries of countries and when the world economy became much more combined. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and then the WTO, the trade liberalization has increased and simultaneously regionalism has been a reality since the 1960s. However, the political agenda of the states was much more involved with the ongoing hegemony war of the bipolar world and the regional divisions within the Latin American countries were not exempt from the ideological effects of the bi-polar world if one takes regard of the Soviet Union's export of ideology.

Due to the continuation of the Cold War and the dominance of the global powers of the world agenda, the general interest in regional politics had been limited until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, this period coincides with the speedup of the globalization. What is significant to note here is the fact that the improvement in the international political economy and multilateral trade agreements should be read as the components of the growing globalization to which states feel the need to give a viable response though such an insurgent need to give a viable response has not been devoid of the trashing effects on the local culture. After the Cold war, each state gradually grew the sense that there is an upcoming need for a change in their political and economic strategies/programs in parallel with the newly re-structuring international system (Gamble 2003). Two dissimilar intentions increased regional politics. One of them was the defense against the globalism on the state level and subaltern social movement level within divided regions and the dominance of the global powers under a regional protectionism; the other intention was taking advantage from the process of globalization (Gamble 2003).

1. Regionalism and the Structure of Regions as the Agents of Liberal Institutionalism

The large and growing body of literature has investigated the globalization and more importantly the various forms in which different states react or comply with it. New regionalism, as assessed one of the ways of compliance, emerging in the mid-

1980s, was not protectionist but rather much more open than the old regionalism of 1960s in terms of capital movement, taxation rules and flexibility in the old protectionist policies. The old regionalism was described with the regional trade agreements aiming to build trade blocks within the regional powers. Just as the protectionist policies that were used as a tool during nation-state building processes, the old regionalism can be perceived as a phenomena that is aimed to create a new sphere within the regional powers, but of a bilateral and multilateral nature since it can be characterized through regional trade agreements mainly. However, the new regionalism created a more complex structure preserving the regional trade agreements, but adding regional organizations and open structure providing trade relations with other global actors, such as the US and European states that would open the regionally protected areas being exposed to the trashing effect of the global agreements. According to Gamble (2000), it strengthened the participation of the states to the world economy. The old regionalism was of a replica of the protectionist nation-state, the countries involved in the agreements after the 90's did not have a protectionist feature, rather the regional agreements functioned as a catalyst to improve trade relations with global actors regardless of the regional divisions within the Latin American countries.

However, numerous studies looking from the security perspective disagree with the economic dimension of the regionalism and the effectiveness of the global powers within the regional dynamics (Buzan 2000, Lake and Morgan 1997, Lemke 2002). Boals (1973) explains the regionalism with the effect of the decolonization and success of the EC. He doesn't exclude the systemic constraints, but he also claims that these constraints do not prevent greater local specification of shared socio-historical characteristics that would be questioned throughout the paper through the case of Zapatista movement that is of a shared socio-historical subaltern identity. Cantori and Spiegel (1973) describe the regional subsystem parallel with the global system having a polar structure related to power relations and its own core and periphery. Buzan (2000) describes the regional dynamics as mini-anarchies and down-scales neo-regionalism to the regions. Generating from what Buzan describes on the state level, one can also claim that regionalisms also create mini-anarchies within the regions of the states which are innately of different culture, identity and even ethnicity and that would lead to social movements claiming for the recognition of their existence. Lake and Morgan (1997) explain the regional security relations with the concept of the "threat perception". The extension of the regional complexes is limited with the effect of the sub-global threats. Thus, if the global powers are not threatened by the sub-global threat, they don't involve in the regional dynamics and order. Lemke (2002) maintains that the regional systems are 'parallel smaller international systems'. Every regional system has its own local hierarchy. Besides, he argues that the great powers are also able to intervene into the regional systems. In Lemke's description, there are different hierarchic subsystems, and on these subsystems, the global hegemon on the top. However, the relation of the region with the hegemon is exceptional. He assumes that

the local hierarchies behave separately, if the global powers do not interfere. In parallel with the state and hegemon level concept, it can also be argued that regionalism also creates a three-level relationship, hegemon-state-subaltern identities. When the hegemon is of an interfering nature, the state naturally gives a response in a coherent way which is of a high possibility that the subaltern identities within the regions of the state would have keen hesitation to comply with.

2. New Regionalism and New Divisions within Countries

The approach separating the local/regional system from the global structure was criticized by scholars highlighting the global (inter)dependence and economic dependency (Katzenstein 2005, Hettne 2005, Fawcett 2003, Farrell 2005). Katzenstein (2005) describes regions "as products of the hegemon, not of the internal dynamics of the region" which makes it clear that regions as the reflection of liberal institutionalism functions in a way that leads to the trashing off the local-subaltern identities (p.82). However, approaches of this kind carry with them various well known limitations since they overlook "the agent effect" of subaltern identities, their criticisms and even their innate power to change the systemic structure, but rather choose to view global world through the general trends. On the other hand, critical theorists (Hettne 2005, Fawcett 2003, Farrell 2005) reject the approach describing the regional systems as a tool of great power influence (Fawcett 2003). They agree with Hemmer and Katzenstein's (2005) argument that the "regions are political creations and not fixed by geography"(p.83). They are built politically, when the political actors need those. However, they don't agree on the political actor driving the process. Hettne (2005) mentions that the driving actors are not global powers on the contrary, regions are integrating to local international organizations and replacing states to counteract the US politics. He names this as a second great transformation (Hettne 2005). Farrell (2005) accepts the systemic hegemonic regionalism, but there is also a "defensive regionalism" emerged from the internal dynamics of the regions. Nevertheless, the strategy has not escaped criticism from academics that these regions are not exempt from the effect of globalization and the driving actors.

After the Second World War, the EU has been accepted as the primary and successful model for regionalism. Latin America followed the EU as a model and became an important region for regionalist policies. In another major study, Bulmer (2001) traces that more and more countries in Americas participated in the regional integration schemes. He underlines the fact that every one of the 33 LAC countries participates in at least one regional scheme and some have joined several (Bulmer 2001). He considers that the Latin American countries accepted regional integration policies "to meet the challenge of globalization in part through a regional response" (Bulmer 2001, p.363). However, the Special Trade Representative Zoellick has described the United States pursuit of regionalism as a strategy to achieve short-term economic goals, help break the problems in the multilateral negotiations (Burfisher; Robinson; Thierfelder 2003). It can be clearly seen that different states (and other

actors) have different descriptions and aims for the regional integration in Latin America. While the US sees regionalism as an opportunity to diverse its multilateral approach, the European Union doesn't approach it as a short-term policy, but a long-term strategy to bring equality and multipolarity in the world order. The EU has chosen regionalism aggressively as a tool of increasing investment and competition, and to provide multipolarity in the international system. (Burfisher; Robinson; Thierfelder 2003). Soderbaum (2003) identifies that the 'old' regionalism in Latin America was taken from the European experience of the formation of European Union. According to Gamble and Payne (2003) the new regionalism theories accept the US as the catalyst of the integration process in Latin America. Hosono and Nishijima (2003) explain that the US' intention towards regionalism increased in the 1990s. After the declaration of Enterprise for the Americas Initiatives in 1990, the Bush government effectuated NAFTA and other Free Trade agreements. Hosono and Nishijima(2003) describe MERCOSUR as 'a counterbalance against the US' regionalism and a foster their negotiating power.

New regionalism was aiming to promote development in the region, but at the same time, implementing the conditions to integration of the Latin American countries to the globalized world. However, the United States and the European Union kept objectifying Latin America in their own rivalry (Rival 2007). The result for the Latin American countries was success to some extent. The region accelerated its development and was integrated into the world economy. However, the agreements such as NAFTA created resentment among the subaltern indigenous identities in Mexico since it included harassment of the lands of Chiapas and meant an implicit end to a subaltern identity. On the other hand, the new regionalism had widened the existing gap between the poor and rich, and increased inequality and the level of corruption (Rival 2007). Upon that background one can more easily get the gist of the reason why such a movement by Zapatista emerged since it is the social class relations, poor-rich, peasantry-urban that plays a crucial role in the form/rhetoric of the movement that will link the movement to the other oppressed parties that will be discussed in communalities and contrasts with the Kurdish nationalist movement, the PKK in Turkey. The term "oppressed" mentioned above is of a amalgamating nature since on the one hand the Zapatista movement in Chiapas are the symbols of rebellion against the unresponsive Mexican state which is indulged in giving a viable response to globalization via integration to the world economy and disregarding the effects on the local level, on the other hand, Kurdish movement emerged as a response to another unresponsive state which has been indulged in building a nation-state and consolidation of this nation-state through military-based institutions.

3. Kurdish Movement as a Response to Homogenizing Nation-Building Mechanism

From its foundation to the 2000's, Turkish political system and Turkish democracy was molded by National Security Council, namely the hegemony of military in politics that can be traced back to 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 military

interventions to re-design the political system and its perceptions of national security. Taking regard of the state and Kurdish relations in the 70's and 80's and even 90's, it is not the elected government dealing with the issue during the first stages but rather the army-dominated National Security Council domination on the issue is evident. The hegemony of military in the political system and the circumvention of civil authorities through military coups or post-modern coups resulted in the violation of "general human rights and the rule of law" in the form of tortures and through the mechanisms of death penalty and restriction of freedom of expression and state security courts (Schimmelfennig 2003, p.506) It is evident that especially during the years of coups, Kurdish people "has suffered from violent repression and lacked minority rights and protection" (Schimmelfennig 2003, p.506) Even till the beginning of 2000's, in the east and southeast of Turkey, there had been a state of emergency valid since these regions were perceived as "the home of the terrorists".

The implementations and the way the military reacts to the events had also some historical, sociological and ideological basis such as 'the way Turkish nationalism was created', 'Turkish nationalism's perception of Kurds' and 'the associations founded between Kurdish community and other non-Muslim communities'. The way Turkish nationalism was created is of a historical basis consisting of the process of transformation from Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. During its last phase, Ottoman Empire's territories were utterly a stage of Turkish refugees re-migrating from the Balkans (hundreds of years later) to Anatolian territory and forming the basis upon which the Turkish nationalism is to depend during the foundation/consolidation years of Turkish Republic. Turkish nationalism "became a strategy of political integration at the beginning of the twentieth century" which is the 'justification' for the coup regimes' implementations in the southeastern part of Turkey in the name of securing the integrity of the Turkish Republic (Yeğen 2009,p.120). It is also evident that just like the description of "White Man's Burden" in English poet Rudyard Kipling's philosophy in the era of colonization, the perception of the Kemalist elites towards the Kurds was the people who need assistance for upgrading their "Turkishness", becoming a white, Sunni, Turkish-speaking and secular individual. "Teaching these "primitive" and "backward" people the Turkish language would be a first step in uplifting them to a more human level"(Bruinesses 1984,p.6) The need of Turkish Kemalist state to "integrate" the region into the western way of life was also adopted in the area of finance and economy besides cultural and issues of identity. It was also evident that the need of integration was functioning in such a way that it turned out to be a way of assimilation and it was also perceived as such when the issue comes to dealing with the cultural aspects of the problem such as Kurdish identity and language. That kind of "forced and systematic assimilation" can be instanced as "Kurdish peasant children being sent to boarding schools in large villages in which Kurdish was forbidden" (Kutschera 1994, p.13). "The eastern provinces also became more integrated in the Turkish economy, but in a way later qualified as "colonial" by

most Kurdish intellectuals" (Bruinesses 1984, p.7) Since the way of integration was perceived as functioning in one way, the criticisms of the Kurdish intellectuals were focused on the colonial aspect of the relationship; though it is not explicit whether their Marxist background played a crucial role in labeling the issue in such a way or the kind of relationship forced them to make use of such a harsh word.

Due to the fact that the Turkish nationalism is prominently owned and claimed to be protected by the military, "the Kurdish question has never been a question 'in itself', or a pure ethnic/national question" and still claimed to be so by many hard-line Turkish nationalists in the political realm (Yeğen 2009, p.121). Somer points out the historical background of the picture as;

> "At this formative stage (establishment process of the Turkish Republic) for both Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, a conflictual rather than accomodative relationship developed between the two. Any plans for local administrative autonomy in Kurdish areas dropped from the political agenda following the foundation of the republic and the Turkish state nationalism and policies became increasingly exclusionary towards the Kurdish identity and assimilationist towards the Kurds after 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion" (Somer 2004, p.240).

Turkish nationalism also created the myth of "Kurds could become future Turks" which still remains merely as a myth however is of significance pointing out the hard-line Turks' views of Kurds (proponents of assimilation policies) and Kurdish question, reflecting the perception as a reminiscent of the establishment process of the Republic. Another militaristic view of Kurdish people is the association of the community with non-Muslim communities which is the extreme view of Kurds as the ally of Israel however is of significance deciphering the extent to which the problem can reach in the debates held in Turkish public.

The problem created de facto agents; of which the most important one is the PKK. Before delving into the ideological aspect of the PKK, it is also worth noting that TIP (Turkish Labour Party) which was of a Marxist tradition and eschewed Marxist ideology as a party program; "acknowledged the Kurdish question-the first time a legal Turkish party had taken even the smallest of steps" in 1970 (Kutschera 1994, p.13).The problem was transformed into a party and the aim was to fight against feudalism and colonialism. Due to the perception of the state as "collaborators" and "colonizers", "the party's program was of a Marxist, Leninist and ultranationalist brand". (Bruinesses 1984, p.11) It is also evident that at the beginning stage, the party's ultimate was "to establish an independent, United Kurdistan". (Bruinesses 1984, p.11)

4. A Comparative Reading between the Zapatista and Kurdish Movement

4.1. Two Continents, Two "Unresponsive State" Cases

The formerly ongoing unresponsiveness of the state for many decades played a crucial role and functioned as a catalyst in the rise of violent actions of the PKK. The

term "unresponsive state" is the key term in defining the reason why these two Marxist movements (Zapatista and the PKK) emerged in Turkey and Mexico.

Just like the state of emergency that was the prominent reason for incursions and detentions in the east and southeast of Turkey till 2003, in Chiapas, "there is not a state of law, but rather a state of latent war and daily life is affected in all arenas by the military omnipresence and by the threat of incursions, detentions, assassinations and rapes" (Johnston 2000,p.476)

The PKK movement had the notion that it was a necessity to awaken the unresponsive state via recurrent attacks, however after its initial attacks, members of Zapatista movement believed that their way should be "looking for a peaceful road to change and should not be led by armed people" (Johnston 2000,p.464) While Zapatista movement can be characterized as a rebellion against the liberal institutionalism and its impacts on the indigenous identities, what makes them different from the PKK movement is their "demand of modern welfare state and employ modern political discourses like nationalism, socialism and feminism" through mobilization of the civil society" (Johnston 2000,p.464)

Both of the movements seem to offer that their engagement with the real guns was stemming from "the desire to communicate the truth of their suffering than by a program to obliterate their enemy", however though this can be fair to claim for Zapatista movement and the beginning period of the PKK movement, it has never been the case for the PKK-Turkey (after the initial years) relations since both of the sides were really ready to oppress each other through the use of ferocity (Johnston 2000,p.466) Regardless of the bloodshed created by the use of armed struggle and the death of military or civil people, both of the movements embraced the use of armed uprising since it was the only way "to educate and raise consciousness using one of the only tools available to them" (Johnston 2000,p.466). On the one hand, existence of Kurdish movement in the parliament provided them with the opportunity to speak louder than before and share the open secret, on the other hand, it was the rapid responding civil society that gave the Zapatista movement a chance to speak louder than before. The leader of the Zapatista movement, Marcos, made frequent claims that they started to make use of weapons as a means to make themselves heard since the Mexican state was wholly involved in the regionalism process and trade agreements and did not pay adequate/any attention to the negative effects on the local sphere.

National Indigenous Congress decision maintains that it is not a secessionist activity but rather an agent working for the democratization of the country, aiming to awaken the civil society and dismiss the state from involving in the deepening process through agreements like NAFTA.

4.2. Two Different Perspectives on the Use of Armed Struggle

The need to struggle against the "collaborators" and "colonizers" emerged on the stage as inevitable and throughout the fight against the Turkish state the PKK eschewed the dogmatic proposals of Marxism and Leninism as a justification for its

armed struggle and it is also "a reflection of the refusal of successive Turkish nationalist regimes to accomodate Kurdish aspirations for cultural and political autonomy" (Kutschera 1994, p.12).

What distinguishes the PKK from Zapatista movement can be characterized as less democratic organization or adaption to Marxist ideology than the use of armed struggle reflecting its mercilessness. On the one hand, PKK's violent actions toward the state and civil people was an obstacle against "the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights" that can be defined as "improving cultural diversity and securing cultural rights (including education in the mother tounge) of Turkish citizens irrespective of their origin" on the other hand, opening new spaces for political participation functioned in a top-to-bottom way since it was the state itself that started the process for solution to the problem (Kirişçi 2011, p.338).

Just like the PKK movement starting against the Kemalist nation-state ideology, "the Zapatista movement challenged racist practices in Mexico by establishing a new awareness of indigenous rights"(Otera 2001,p.24) In contrast to the PKK movement using armed means in various regions of Turkey, especially in the east and southeast regions of Turkey, "the Zapatista Army of National Liberation has consistently defied popular expectations of guerilla struggle" and it changed its direction towards the aim of "mobilizing civil society" which shows that it is more of a democratic centralist vision and an inclusive perspective for the other actors in the political and social sphere (Johnston 2000,p.463).

It is also evident that the use of armed-struggle against the official forces of the state is of a Marxist-eschewed idea since it reminds of Gramscian distinction between "war of movement" and "war of position" and it does not take a genius to observe that Zapatista movement made use of the armed struggle in a way that "war of position" that attacks on the ideas, actions and stimulates the potential of the civil society to create "recognition" emerges on the stage. The armed uprising of PKK can be claimed to start with Gramscian idea of "war of position" however it is not utterly fair to claim that it persisted on such a nature and target. Zapatista movement aimed at long-term "change at the level of individual consciousness, state institutions, material structures, and civil society" rather than awaiting for a sudden revolution changing the structure of the power (Johnston 2000,p.468). They were the armed reformists seeking an alternative country that would be realized through a change in the party state. The reason why Zapatista movement did not act for a sudden social revolution and a total rebellion was based on the historical background of Mexico and the psychology behind this incremental action of Zapatista movement can be put into words as such;

> The history of failed social revolution in Mexico partially explains the Zapatistas' decision to wage their war on the level of civil society. The Zapatistas' choice of armed pedagogy may also have been based on an understanding of the weak social basis underlying the Mexican state's implementation of a globalization project (Johnston 2000, p.469)

In respect to the PKK movement, though Zapatista movement did not play any role in the Mexican political sphere as a political party, the leader of Zapatista movement is of the idea that "armed uprising and democracy are fundamentally incompatible", it was the political parties and their existence in the Turkish Parliament that leads the PKK towards the idea that armed struggle and being an actor in the conflict solution cannot be in parallel (Johnston 2000,p.469).

4.3. The Overlap of Social Class and Regional Characteristics

Zapatista movement emerged as a reaction to the incremental rise in neo-liberal implementations and it created agents like Marcos, the leader of the movement, "struggling for the right to define themselves culturally, socially and politically" and it was also reflected that the movement was working for the benefits of the peasants whose lands are in hazard (Sholk 2007,p. 49). When the movement gave its first bloom, just as Özal uttered when the PKK violence was on the rise, they were defined as "professionals of violence and transgressors of the law" by the Mexican authorities, however, differently from the Turkish- the PKK case, Mexican civil society gave a rapid response demanding an end to incursions by the Mexican army (Johnston 2000,p.465). Within the PKK groups, one can claim that the ones fighting against the military, and involving in bombing attacks are of the terrorists whose socio-cultural background is basically of peasantry life-style who felt themselves being thrown out of the socio-political system, and it is also the case for Zapatista movement improving "peasant resistance to economic marginalization and political exclusion" since they were the ones whose lands and thus identities were threatened due to NAFTA agreement that was described as a death sentence since it promised no future for the farmers (Johnston 2000,p.465). The members of both the PKK and the Zapatista movements were of a rural background, it was the class-region relationship that plays a role in stimulating them towards a war against "the imperialism of capitalist economic systems" created by the regionalisms (Johnston 2000,p.472). In the cases of hydroelectric plants in Turkey, the general perception in region developed in such a way that it was described as resource exploitation in the region very similar to the increasing voices in Mexico about the environment issues. Zapatista movement emerged against the NAFTA agreement that would harm their lands and thus their indigenous identities thus their actions were justified as anti-corporate activism

The last but not the least, it can also be argued that there is also communality of the two regions (Chiapas in Mexico, The Southeast and East of Turkey) in respect to being underdeveloped relative to the other regions of the respective countries and providing vast lands as the prominent tool for economic development. Both of the movements have an ethnic and territorial link with a specific region in these countries and the economic, social, ethnic status of these regions actually defined principal targets of these movements.

4.4. Global Solidarities: Pragmatism in Action

Zapatista movement did not only find partners within Mexico but also created links with global solidarities, however, when taken regard of the PKK movement, one can easily appreciate the conditionality of global actors such as EU and PKK's opening offices in the capitals of member states. Though both of the movements eschewed Marxist rhetoric and acted against the capitalist powers (regionalism for the case of Zapatista movement) and state oppressions (for both of the cases), the way they created solidarities functioned in a way benefiting from the fruits of globalization. Political lobbying and human rights interventions were the case in Zapatista-global solidarities and PKK-Kurdish Parties-EU relations. When it comes to benefit from the advantages of globalization, both of the movements seem to act pragmatically since Zapatista movement perceived "the internet as a means to enhance local organizing rather than replace it with something else" and PKK financed ROJ TV broadcasts in different EU members as a support to its "righteous" violent actions upon which various official inspectors from European Union (working on the issues of human rights or minority rights) have visited important southeast eastern Anatolia cities such as Diyarbakır and Van (Laxer 2003,p.74).

4.5. The Zapatista and Kurdish Movement as a Catalyst for the Revitalization of Other Identities and Environmental Claims

The generalisability of much published research on this issue is problematic since the focus is on the anti-force nature of such movements and restricted to the milieu of movements, no single study exists that focuses not only on the dynamics of the movements but also the movements' reinforcing effect on the other subaltern identities within the same countries. Ongoing Kurdish problem gave rise to awareness to different identities and the most significant result of the "solution process" was the democratization of the country and government's being the only responsible agent in dealing with the problem. It is significant to note that "the Zapatista uprising contributed to an expansion of democracy in the domain of political society but also beyond it-into civil society and the cultural sphere" (Otera 2001,p.24) In the case of Zapatista movement, "new spaces for political participation have been opened within civil society"(Otera 2001,p.24) The inclusive rhetoric adopted by the Zapatista movement and the Kurdish Parties such as DTP(Democratic Turkey Party), PDP (Peace and Democracy Party) functioned in the consolidation of the sub-identities who were also exposed to the cold face of the one-party state. On the one hand, the groups called Tezeltal, Tzotzil and Chol in Mexico, on the other Alevis, Gypsy communities in Turkey revitalized themselves and succeeded in speaking louder than before to put their problems into the agendas of the political parties on power. It can be fair to argue that such a first step and development in the agendas of political parties on power and their perceived responsiveness to the problems of subaltern communities created a boomerang effect that revitalized the need for more democracy but not for holiness of the state but for the wholeness the individuals will compromise. Besides asking for more democracy, all of these groups involved in the process demanding economic

equality, political participation and cultural recognition, though they differ from PKK and Zapatista movement on the point that they did not ask for self-determination in the socio-political sphere.

National Indigenous Congress decision emphasizes that it is not a secessionist activity but rather the one claiming for a more democratically consolidated country, aiming to awaken and dismiss the state from indulgence into global trade agreements that would be the death sentence; and the congress points out their desire with the words of "we don't mean that we deny ourselves of our Fatherland, which was founded with our blood" (Laxer 2003, p.68). After the beginning of the Solution Process in Turkey in the last years, Öcalan, entrapped in the southern Marmara region island, İmralı, the leader of PKK movement, made a declaration in 2012 on the 21st of March and generally emphasized the continuation of brotherhood among the peoples of Turkey. Zapatista movement has never had a secessionist approach when it took armed struggle as a tool. PKK movement started with the aim of freeing colonized Kurdish people and establishing an independent Kurdistan, then evolved into a more democratic framework than a nationalist one if the explanations made by the founder of the movement is taken into consideration.

Conclusion

The Zapatista movement was born with the Marxist ideology and evolved within it. If one takes regard of the beginning of Kurdish movement, Sheikh Said rebellion is the first case symbolizing a revolt against the homogenizing effect of the nation-state building process, however it is also worth noting that the Kurdish movement did not have Marxist ideology as a guide at the beginning but evolved into one in time due to not only the class relationship but also the nationalist interests. Both of the movements (the Zapatista and Kurdish movement) emerged out of a general context of oppression, while the former one is set out to make their objections to the trashing effects of NAFTA on their identities and lands, the latter one is set out to break and transform the nation-building mechanisms of the state. Though Zapatista movement started as an armed rebellion to make their objections heard, it did not persist on the use of arms in order not to decrease their plausibility and credibility; it is still unclear whether this characteristic created pro-Zapatista movements all around the world or pro-Zapatista movements all around the world prevented the original Zapatista movement in Mexico to leave the armed struggle, or these two processes are within each other without any organic relationship. The PKK that is the agent of armed struggle in Kurdish movement, and that's why throughout the paper the PKK is referred overwhelmingly, has dominated the movement. However it is not the case for EZLN and that's why throughout the article, the term of Zapatista movement is overwhelmingly used rather than EZLN since the armed struggle was only an offspring of the movement but never symbolized the development of it. Both of the movements are of a characteristic that to the extent that they have been successful in transforming the attitudes of the elites towards the objections of subaltern identities,

the change of attitudes have also been reflected upon the other-subaltern identities. The more influence both of these movements have had on the systemic patterns and the mentality of the institutions of the states, it functioned as a catalyst in the democratization/even democratic consolidation of the countries concerned. The social groups and identities called Tezeltal, Tzotzil and Chol in Mexico have had more opportunity to raise their voices just like the other subaltern identities in Turkey who are not Sunni, white, secularized and Turk whose political inclusiveness is on the trend of being more visible. One of the main divisions is the effect of civil society that contributed much in the case of Zapatista which is of a bottom-to-top nature and top-to-bottom nature of the Turkish democratization process in 2000's. It is only after the growth of the perception that the Turkish state has rejected its unresponsiveness and assimilation policies, civil society groups started to engage themselves in.

Lastly, the Zapatista and the PKK seem to relate themselves to a specific land or region, Chiapas and Southeast and East of Turkey in respective, however the effect of these movements were never limited to a specific area thanks to the factors of solidarities and civil society.

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